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The operational plans 
 The attack on Iraq, or Operation Iraqi Freedom as it was called, would be 
very different from its predecessor Operation Desert Storm, 12 years before. The 
main strategic difference was, of course, the fact that Desert Storm encompassed an 
enormous international military coalition, with ground, air and naval forces being 
supplied by America, Britain, France, Italy, Australia, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Syria. Iraqi Freedom was shouldered by only two countries, the US and 
the UK, with Australia supplying a small contingent of SAS troops, the Czech 
Republic a platoon of chemical warfare troops and Spain a hospital ship.  
 To drive the Iraqi occupying forces out of Kuwait in 1991, an enormous 
force of 15 divisions had been amassed. These had been organised into 3 American 
corps (XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of two airborne divisions, a  mechanised 
infantry division, as well as a French light armoured division; VII Corps, consisting 
of three US and one UK armoured divisions and one US mechanised infantry 
division; and a US Marine corps, consisting of two Marine divisions), a Saudi 
Arabian corps of two divisions, an Egyptian corps of two divisions, and a Syrian 
division.3 For Iraqi Freedom, only a single army corps (V), consisting of two 
mechanised infantry divisions and an airborne division, together with a marine 
division, an understrength composite British armoured division, and some smaller 
independent units, was available. And because of political wrangling, one 
mechanised infantry division arrived far too late on the battlefield to participate in 
                                                          
1 This is the second part in a series of three articles. 
2 Dr Scholtz is also Deputy Editor of Die Burger and holds the rank of Captain in the 
SAArmy Reserve Force. 
3 See battle map in Rick Atkinson: Crusade. The untold story of the Gulf War (London, 
HarperCollins, 1994), p. 517; as well as Tom Clancy & Fred Franks: Into the storm. 
On the ground in Iraq (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 2000), p. 239. 
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the fighting. So, compared to 15 divisions in 1991, the job would now have to be 
done by only four. Nevertheless, with the new American weapons of precision and 
the extremely able Abrams tank, a repeat of Gulf War I was not really necessary. 
 To digress somewhat: There is a story, told by Tom Clancy, which illustrates 
the extreme toughness of the Abrams tank which was to play an important role in the 
coming offensive, and which was by far the superior of the antique T-55’s, T-62’s 
and even the more modern T-72’s which the Iraqis got from the Soviet Union. 
During the war of 1991, an Abrams of the 24th Mechanised Infantry Division got 
stuck in a mud hole and had to wait for a recovery vehicle, while the rest of the unit 
moved on. “Suddenly, as they were waiting, three Iraqi T-72 tanks came over a hill 
and charged the mud-bogged tank. One T-72 fired a high-explosive anti-tank 
(HEAT) round that hit the frontal turret armour of the M1, but did no damage. At 
this point, the crew of the M1, though still stuck, fired a 120mm armour-piercing 
round at the attacking tank. The round penetrated the T-72’s turret, blowing it off 
into the air. By this time, the second T-72 also fired a HEAT round at the M1. That 
also hit the front of the turret, and did no damage. The M1 immediately dispatched 
this T-72 with another 120mm round. After that, the third and last T-72 fired a 
125mm armour-piercing round at the M1 from a range of 400 meters. This only 
grooved the front armour plate. Seeing that continued action did not have much of a 
future, the crew of the last T-72 decided to run for cover. Spying a nearby sand 
berm, the Iraqis darted behind it, thinking they would be safe there. Back in the M1, 
the crew saw through their Thermal Imaging Sight (TIS) the hot plume of the T-72’s 
engine exhaust spewing up from behind the berm. Aiming carefully through the TIS, 
the M1’s crew fired a third 120mm round through the berm, into the tank, destroying 
it.” 
 But this was not the end of the story. Even two recovery vehicles, coming to 
the rescue could not dislodge the stuck tank. So other M1’s started firing on it. Two 
rounds failed to penetrate. The third penetrated the turret, causing the ammunition to 
detonate. But the blast was vented upwards through a blow-out panel, and the 
onboard fire-suppression system stopped the fire before any real damage was done 
to the electronics. Finally, with the help of additional recovery vehicles, the tank was 
towed out. “Upon examination, the M1 was found to be operational, with only the 
sights out of alignment from the blast of the ammunition cooking off.” The tank was 
repaired and returned to action.4 A truly remarkable story that illustrates the almost 
unbelievable toughness and striking power of the M1A1/2 Abrams. 
                                                          
4 Tom Clancy: Armoured warfare: A guided tour of an armoured Calvary regiment 
(London, HarperCollings, 1996), pp. 57-58. 
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 Interestingly, the final coalition operational plan was the result of intense 
political infighting, both internally in the Pentagon, and internationally. As the 
infighting in the Pentagon progressed, successive versions of the operational plan 
were leaked to the press as the one side or the other tried to discredit their 
opponents. Apparently, defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld was furious, but 
powerless to stop it. 
 The first version, leaked to the New York Times, was an orthodox heavy 
offensive with an overwhelming armoured force of 250 000 ground troops, coming 
from three sides – from Kuwait in the south, Jordan in the west and Turkey in the 
north.5 The next version was the exact opposite, dubbed “Baghdad first” by the 
media. It would consist of an airborne force of only a few thousand men, and it 
would mean the capture of Baghdad in one fell swoop, thereby decapitating the 
Saddam Hussein regime right at the start.6 (Contrast this extraordinary lapse of 
operational security with Gulf I, when General Norman Schwarzkopf, the then 
overall commander, fiercely forbade his officers to discuss operational matters with 
the media. “I will deal brutally with anyone who compromises anything from 
operations,” he threatened them.7) 
 This infighting about the battle plan was directly connected to the power 
struggle between Rumsfeld and most of the army generals about transforming the 
army into a much lighter and more mobile force, depending much more on special 
forces, the latest technology and precision weapons, and air strikes. Both sides were 
obviously very anxious to have Operation Iraqi Freedom prove the correctness of 
their vision.8 
 In the process, Rumsfeld, who is known as an arrogant, impatient man, 
probably overstepped his competency as political head of the department of defence. 
His job was to oversee the armed forces being prepared for war, period. He was, 
therefore, quite within his rights to demand the transformation of the army. But he 
went considerably further than that. According to one credible-sounding exposé, the 
secretary micromanaged the development of the battle plan to an incredible degree. 
His inner circle of civilian planners even “took over crucial aspects of the day-to-day 
logistical planning”. As one source put it, “He thought he knew better. He was the 
decision-maker at every turn.” 
                                                          
5 Eric Schmitt: “U.S. plan for Iraq is said to include attack on 3 sides” (New York 
Times, 5.7.2002). 
6 Tom Shanker: “Bush hears options including Baghdad strike” (New York Times, 
7.8.2002). 
7 Clancy & Franks: Into the Storm, p. 192. 
8 CF. Julian Borger et al: “How the Pentagon’s promise of a quick war ran into the 
desert sand” (The Guardian, 28.3.2003). 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 32, Nr 1, 2004. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
 4
 The generals drew up six successive plans, of which Rumsfeld rejected the 
first five, demanding every time that the number of ground troops be reduced. At 
first, the idea was for an air bombing campaign lasting 20 days, which was changed 
to 10 and then to 5 days. (In the event, there was no preparatory bombing campaign 
at all.) Rumsfeld insisted that a smaller, faster-moving attack force, combined with 
overwhelming air power, would suffice. “You’ve got too much ground force – go 
back and to it again,” he reportedly told his generals. He even vetoed the moving of 
the 3rd mechanised Infantry Division’s own armour to Kuwait, relying on 
prepositioned weapons in the Middle East. Thereby, he made further deployments 
by other divisions all but impossible. One general spoke about “an atmosphere of 
derision and challenge”.9 
 Another anonymous but apparently informed informed observer was quoted 
thus: “Rumsfeld ridiculed what he called unimaginative, traditional military thinking 
that proposed large numbers of conventional forces to engage in the attack on Iraq. 
He did this frequently, and the result was an initial plan in which the attacking forces 
consisted of two Army brigades and a Marine Expeditionary Unit – no more than 10 
000 in the ground manoeuvre formations (most destruction was to be achieved by 
special forces and air power). … Rumsfeld exacerbated the first point by creating an 
environment in which alternative points of view were exposed to criticism and those 
who challenged were ostracised.”10 
 To be fair, after the war Franks categorically denied any bad feelings 
between Rumsfeld and the generals. In an interview, which unfortunately gives the 
impression of spinning the message, he made the discussions out to be part of a 
normal process of debate and planning. He told a journalist that 15 to 20 different 
“what ifs” – likely scenarios – were drawn up, and the “two bookends”, as he called 
it, the original army heavy plan and Rumsfeld’s original light plan, were then 
balanced “by using computer modelling, force-on-force constructs, until we decided 
we had hit about the best point, and that is how the plan was created. It evolved.”11 
 While one has to assume that Franks is telling the truth, it very much looks 
like being only part of the truth. 
                                                          
9 Seymour M. Hersh: “Offense and defense” (The New Yorker, 4.7.2003); Rowan 
Scarborough: “ ‘Decisive force’ now measured by speed” (The Washington Times, 
7.5.2003).  
10 Anthony H. Cordesman: Iraq war note: Non-pause, the true logistics story, and 
blaming Rumsfeld, 29.3.2003, at www.csis.org/features/030329_warnote.pdf.  
11 Joseph L. Galloway: “General Tommy Franks discusses conducting the war in Iraq” 
(Knight Ridder, 19.6.2003). 
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 Be that as it may, in the end a compromise of sorts was reached. Rumsfeld’s 
airborne attack on Baghdad was replaced with a lightning armoured and airborne 
march on Baghdad from two sides, from Kuwait in the south and Turkey in the 
north. From the north would come the army’s “digitalised” division, the 4th 
mechanised Infantry. From the south would come the 3rd mechanised Infantry 
Division (reinforced with a composite brigade of attack and transport helicopters 
from US forces in Germany, as well as the 7th Cavalry Regiment, which normally 
was part of the 1st Cavalry Division), the 1st Marine Division (augmented by a 
brigade-strength Marine unit, known as Task Force Tarawa), the rather weak 1 (UK) 
Armoured Division (the latter being a composite unit, consisting of 7 Armoured 
Brigade, the famed “Desert Rats”, as well as 16 Airmobile Brigade, and a brigade of 
Royal Marines). Simultaneously, the 101st Airborne Division (later reinforced with a 
brigade of the 82nd Airborne) would carry out massive airborne attacks, possibly on 
the airport of Baghdad, but also to seize oilfields, dams and banned weapons. The 
south-east of Iraq, the capture of Basra, would be left to the British division, while 
the British Royal Marine Brigade, assisted by some American Marines, would 
capture the Faw peninsula right at the start. In addition, about 10 000 special force 
troops – the most ever in a single campaign – would be deployed. In total, about 130 
000 ground troops were to be involved.12 
 According to Franks himself, the plan had several characteristics. Firstly, it 
involved surprise. Secondly, it had to be flexible enough “to either have airpower 
first or ground power first. To either have Tomahawks first, or Tomahawks 
someplace else. To introduce Special Operations forces in large numbers in order to 
come to grips with each potential problem we thought we might face”. Five fronts 
were identified: The northern front, the western desert bordering Jordan, the 
Baghdad-Tikrit area (being the enemy centre of gravity), the southern areas between 
Kuwait and Baghdad, and the information war. (As far as the last was concerned, 
special forces cut Iraq’s fibre optic cables, which could not be tapped, so that the 
Iraqi’s were forced to use radio, satellite and cellular phone communications, which 
could be intercepted.)13 
                                                          
12 Esther Schrader & Tyler Marshall: “War shapes up as huge land attack” (Los Angeles 
Times, 27.1.2003); William M. Arkin: “The dividends of delay” (Los Angeles Times, 
23.2.2003); Richard T. Cooper & Aaron Zitner: “3 Divisions with 3 histories, 3 styles 
and 1 goal: Baghdad” (Los Angeles Times, 6.4.2003); Julian Borger: “New plan to 
land first US troops deep inside Iraq” (The Guardian, 14.2.2003); Michael Smith: “US 
forced to consider ‘battle lite’ options” (The Telegraph, 10.3.2003); Kim Burger et al: 
“What went right?” (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28.4.2003). 
13 Joseph L. Galloway: “General Tommy Franks discusses conducting the war in Iraq” 
(Knight Ridder, 19.6.2003). 
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 However, even this plan could not be carried out fully. The Turkish 
government, whose co-operation was needed for the deployment of the 4th Infantry, 
played hardball by demanding a considerable say in how the Iraq problem was to be 
handled after the war, as well as billions of dollars in development aid. After an 
accord was reached, the Turkish parliament, however, rejected it narrowly. This 
meant that the northern front would be reduced to special forces and possibly 
airborne troops, and that the heavy 4th Infantry became effectively hors de combat. 
Even though its equipment was brought by sea from the shores of Turkey, where it 
waited to be disembarked to Kuwait, the war was over before a single soldier from 
this division could see action.14 
 This was a great disappointment for the US Army. The 4th was a prototype, 
the first digitalised division in the world, and officers had been very keen to see how 
it would perform under modern battlefield conditions. Nevertheless, the Americans 
immediately transformed the problem into a strategic asset. After the war, Donald 
Rumsfeld told Central Command military personnel at the coalition HQ in Qatar that 
General Franks deliberately waited before diverting the division’s equipment from 
the sea off Turkey to the Gulf, to fool the Iraqis into believing that the offensive was 
not imminent. It also transpired that Saddam was being fed deliberate 
disinformation, that the Turkish hard-headedness was only a sham and that the main 
offensive would come from the north after all.15 If Saddam, in the absence of a 
northern front reinforced his defences in the south, coalition planners worried that it 
would create big problems for the offensive.16 
 Even so, the absence of a Turkish front still created huge problems for the 
campaign plan. The offensive had to be reconfigured to take place only from the 
south and with one heavy division less, it meant a sizeable reduction in the coalition 
firepower on the ground. An American mechanised infantry division is not that 
different from an armoured division. Whereas the latter consist mostly of five tank 
and four mechanised infantry battalions, a mechanised infantry division – such as 
the 3rd and the 4th – consists of four tank and five mechanised infantry battalions, 
plus, of course, artillery and a wide range of divisional support units. (The 3rd 
                                                          
14 Amberin Zaman & Paul Richter: “Turkish demand risks impeding war strategy” (Los 
Angeles Times, 19.2.2003); Owen Bocott et al: “Bush’s war timetable unravelling” 
(The Guardian, 20.2.2003); Louis Meixler: “U.S. forced to rethink Iraq war strategy” 
(Washington Post, 3.3.2003). 
15 Paul Martin: “Rumsfeld fires up U.S. forces in Qatar” (Washington Times, 29.4.2003); 
Evan Thomas & Martha Brant: “The education of Tommy Franks” (Newsweek, 
19.5.2003). Cf. also Steve Coll: “Hussein was sure of own survival” (Washington 
Post, 3.11.2003). 
16 See for instance Patrick Wintour: “Either Tony knows something that the rest of us 
don’t know, or he’s insane” (The Guardian, 26.3.2003). 
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Infantry, bolstered with additional forces, was almost 20 000 men strong, with more 
than 250 Abrams tanks and more than 280 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and 
more than 150 gunship and utility helicopters.17) 
 Compared to the 3rd Infantry, which was the US army’s specialised desert 
warfare division, the other American units were fairly light. The 1st Marine Division 
had only two tank battalions, the rest being infantry mostly transported in lightly 
armoured and armed amphibious tracked vehicles, plus divisional artillery and other 
support units. Both the 3rd Infantry and the 1st Marines also had their own organic 
helicopter brigade, including gunships. On the other hand, the 101st and 82nd 
Airborne Divisions were meant to be extremely mobile, being able to be 
helicoptered very fast and fairly far into battle. They had, therefore, to be lightly 
armed with all weapons (including artillery and at least some vehicles) having to be 
transportable by the division’s own helicopters. They did, however, have their own 
organic gunship units. 
 The coalition order of battle looked something like this: 
 
                                                          
17 Steven Lee Meyers: “Doubt and death on drive to Baghdad” (The New York Times, 
10.4.2003). 
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                                                  Tommy Franks**** (C-in-C, Central Command) 
 
      
 
T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley*** (Air Force)                    Timothy J. Keating*** (Navy) 
 
 
 
                                                        David McKiernan*** (Ground forces) 
 
 
 
William Scott Wallace*** (V Corps)         James T. Conway*** (1st Marine 
                                                                                         Expeditionary Force) 
 
 
 
Buford Blount III** (3rd mech. Inf. Div.)   James N. Mattis** (1st Marine Div.) 
David Petraeus** (101st Airborne Div.)      Richard E. Natanski*(Task Force Tarawa) 
Brigade of 82nd Airborne Div.                                                                     
7th Cav. Regt. Robin Brims** (1st UK Armoured Div.) 
                                                           11th Attack Helicopter Regt. 
                                                           173rd Airborne Brigade 
 
 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 32, Nr 1, 2004. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
 9
 It ought to be clear that the coalition forces were taking a chance, especially 
because it was not known whether especially the heavily armed Iraqi Republican 
Guard would stand and fight tenaciously, as they did in 1991. If that was the case, 
the advance could get into great trouble. 
 The final coalition operational plan cannot be properly understood without 
knowledge of the Iraqi intentions and their order of battle. When the war started, US 
intelligence estimated that Iraq still had an army of roughly 700 000 men. These 
were organised into five regular army corps and two Republican Guard corps. The 
regular army had 17 divisions, of which 11 were low-capability infantry divisions, 
mainly staffed with badly trained, equipped and led conscripts with low morale and 
without any stomach for the fight. The other six – three armoured and three 
mechanised infantry divisions – were not much better off, but at least they had 
heavy, if obsolete, weapons. Their tanks, for instance, were mostly old T-55’s, 
which stood absolutely no chance against the modern American Abrams and British 
Challenger 2 main battle tanks. The regular army was also thought to have two 
special forces divisions. 
 The much better equipped, trained and led Republican Guard had two corps 
with six divisions – three armoured and three mechanised infantry. They were 
mainly equipped with the T-72, the best in the Iraqi arsenal, but still no match for 
either the Abrams or the Challenger 2. However, because of Republican Guard 
officers having led several attempts to depose Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi president 
did not allow these formations inside Baghdad. Only the four Special Republican 
Guards brigades with 14 battalions of motorised infantry, which were viewed as the 
elite of the elite, were permitted in the capital. (It must be noted that Iraqi divisions 
were much weaker than their coalition counterparts, being modelled in the old 
Soviet army’s divisions and having 8 000-10 000 men each.) Finally, according to 
US estimates, Iraq had 19 reserve brigades and 15 People’s Army Brigades, as well 
as the so-called Saddam Fedayeen, a militia of 18 000-20 000 men.18  
 Some of these were sent into Kuwait before the shooting started to gather 
intelligence on the coalition forces there.19 It is, however, not clear whether these 
spies succeeded in passing anything of value to their superiors. Even if they did, in 
the end it did not matter much. 
                                                          
18 Anthony H. Cordsman: If we fight Iraq: Iraq and the conventional military balance 
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28.6.2002), p. 3, at 
www.csis.org/burke/mb/fightiraq_mb.pdf.  
19 Peter Baker: “A prosaic description of unspeakable torture” (Washington Post, 
22.4.2003). 
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 US intelligence further reported a very interesting deployment of Iraqi 
forces. To start with, a total of 14 divisions were positioned north of Baghdad, 
clearly to ward off the expected invasion of the US 4th mechanised Infantry Division 
from Turkey and to control the rebellious Kurds. Perhaps participation of the 
Turkish Army was also feared. In central Iraq there were three divisions, with six in 
the south. Furthermore, only regular army formations were stationed at the northern 
and southern extremes of the country. The six Republican Guard divisions were 
around Baghdad – three to the north and the other three to the south.20 
 Two conclusions may be drawn from this. 
 First, in the light of the Turkish front having decreased drastically in 
importance, the Iraqi forces were hopelessly wrongly positioned to defend the 
country against a coalition invasion. The Iraqis put their heaviest punch in the north, 
whereas the only assault would now come from the south. But even when the 
northern invasion was still on the cards, only one division would come from there, 
compared to four from the south, which makes the Iraqi dispositions downright silly. 
Clearly, the US disinformation fed to Saddam was having the desired effect, making 
the greater part of the Iraqi forces irrelevant to the battle even before it began. 
 Secondly, it was clear that Saddam had no serious plans to try and stop the 
invading forces as far away from the capital as possible, his most useless troops 
being placed out on a limb. It seems as if he wanted the Americans to come to 
Baghdad, where he could decimate them in urban warfare. In urban war, the 
advantages of the Americans – their technology and firepower, their command of the 
air and their mobility – would, after all, be neutralised to some extent. He evidently 
placed his hope on a lot of American casualties, probably supposing that Vietnam 
showed the American inability to tolerate a lot of filled body bags. Also, he probably 
banked on a lot of civilian blood being seen on the world’s TV screens, with the 
hope of international pressure forcing the coalition forces to leave with their tails 
between their legs.21 
 Some public pronouncements tend to confirm this view. Already in 
September, 2002 a senior member of the Iraqi cabinet, Mohammed Mehdi Saleh, 
was reported to have said, “Take the desert. What’s in the desert? If they want to 
change the political system in Iraq, they have to come to Baghdad. We will wait for 
                                                          
20 Anthony H. Cordsman: If we fight Iraq: Iraq and the conventional military balance 
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28.6.2002), pp. 3-4, at 
www.csis.org/burke/mb/fightiraq_mb.pdf. 
21 See also Peter Beaumont: “Allies fear Iraq plotting ‘scorched earth’ war” (The 
Observer, 23.2.2003); Michael R. Gordon: “Reading Saddam’s mind” (The New York 
Times, 3.3.2003). 
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them here.”22 And during the same time, deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz 
responded to a question: “People say to me,” he had said, “‘you are not the 
Vietnamese, you have no jungles or swamps to hide in.’ I reply ‘let our cities be 
swamps and our buildings jungles.’”23 
 Certain commentators opine that the Iraqis made a study of the US 
experience in Somalia in 1993, when American troops were badly mauled in 
Mogadishu by irregulars.24 Especially the bakkies used by the Somalis (the 
Americans called them technical vehicles), with light or heavy machine guns 
mounted on the back, were copied by the Iraqis with the idea of attacking the 
American lines of communication and eventually bleeding the advance to death by 
preventing the flow of supplies.25 
 After the Turkish fiasco, the amended coalition plan now called for a landing 
by Royal Marines on the Faw peninsula, a British drive behind the US Marines 
towards Basra, and a lightning two-pronged advance to Baghdad with the 3rd 
Infantry in the west towards Karbala and the 1st Marines more or less along the 
Tigris towards Kut. “Shock and awe” was the catchword being used in all the media 
briefings, probably to intimidate the Iraqis beforehand. In view of the northern 
invasion from the direction of Turkey being out of the question, some reports 
suggested a huge airborne operation by the 101st to northern Iraq. Baghdad was seen 
as the Iraqi centre of gravity, the capture of which would deal the Iraqi regime and 
war effort a death blow. The idea was further not to soften up the Iraqi forces on the 
border by a protracted air campaign as in 1991, but to encourage them to surrender, 
rather than fight. Also, much emphasis was placed on speed, speed and more speed, 
in the hope of dislocating the Iraqi defence.26 
                                                          
22 Rajiv Chandrasekaran: “Iraqi military may plan urban warfare in case of U.S. attack” 
(Washington Post, 27.9.2002). 
23 R.W. Apple jr.: “US commander, evoking MacArthur, hops past cities to Baghdad” 
(New York Times, 4.4.2003). 
24 Julian Borger et al: “How the Pentagon’s promise of a quick war ran into the desert 
sand” (The Guardian, 28.3.2003). The movie Black Hawk down and the book by 
Mark Bowden with the same title (Black Hawk down: A story of modern war, London, 
Penguin, 2000) was based on this event. 
25 Kenneth M. Pollack: “Reassessing the Iraqi adversary” (Brookings Institute, Iraq 
memo #14, 3.4.2003) at www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/pollack/20030403.htm. 
26 Dan Plesch: “Operation regime change” (The Guardian, 19.2.2003); Sean Rayment & 
Julian Coman: “Paras will make lightning assault on Baghdad airport” (The 
Telegraph, 9.3.2003); Michael Smith: “US forced to consider ‘battle lite’ options” 
(The Telegraph, 10.3.2003); Michael E. Gordon: “Allied plan would encourage Iraqis 
not to fight” (The New York Times, 11.3.2003); Julian Borger: “Short, sharp shock 
will avoid street fighting, say Pentagon planners” (The Guardian, 11.3.2003); Patrick 
Bishop: “Allied plan gives Iraqis chance to topple Saddam” (The Telegraph, 
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 It was not without reason that the British were being relegated to the south-
east of Iraq, with the Americans getting the lion’s share of the offensive. As General 
Wesley Clark, C-in-C of the Nato forces attacking Yugoslavia in 1999, explained, 
the British forces were “badly in need of increased resourcing. Already, the forces 
are perhaps a generation behind the best available technology in some areas, and are 
hard-stretched in support.”27 Besides, the Brits used different ammunition and even 
different types of fuel, so that they needed their own supply lines. Their radio 
communications were based on technology from the seventies. All of this would 
create a lot of extra problems.28  
 It was also thought that the Iraqi regime might crumble before it became 
necessary to get embroiled in costly street fighting in Baghdad. The idea was to 
encircle the city, carrying out precision strikes at military strongholds until the 
defences collapsed.29 The advance would be accompanied by a sustained air 
campaign, aimed at decimating the Iraqi defences even before the fight really 
started. However, for political reasons, military lawyers would have the last say to 
determine whether targets were either wholly or predominantly civilian in nature. In 
fact, many targets were taken off the list, especially during the first few days.30 
 Obviously, viewed without hindsight (which is always 20-20), much could 
go wrong with the plan. Donald Rumsfeld used to keep a document in his drawer 
which he continually updated after talks with his officers and advisors. In the 
document, Rumsfeld expressed concern that Saddam might use weapons of mass 
destruction against American troops, blow up his oil fields, and use civilians or even 
coalition prisoners as human shields. And, of course, the duration of the war worried 
him and people around him. “How long will this go on?” an administration official 
asked. “Three days, three weeks, three months, three years?”31 
 General Franks was not very sanguine. After the war he told a journalist that 
he expected the war to last 120 days, rather than the three weeks it actually did.32 
Other American officers were more hopeful. “We literally could be in Baghdad in 
                                                                                                                           
15.3.2003); Michael E. Gordon: “Baghdad’s power vacuum is drawing only dissent” 
(The New York Times, 21.4.2003). 
27 Wesley Clark: “Brits brilliant but short in resources” (The Times, 17.4.2003). 
28 Julian Borger et al: “How the Pentagon’s promise of a quick war ran into the desert 
sand” (The Guardian, 28.3.2003). 
29 Julian Borger: “Short, sharp shock will avoid street fighting, say Pentagon planners” 
(The Guardian, 11.3.2003). 
30 Richard Norton-Taylor: “Lawyers scrutinise strike plan” (The Guardian, 20.3.2003). 
31 David E. Sanger & Tom Shanker: “War planners begin to speak of war’s risks” (The 
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three or four days,” one general in Kuwait told the well-known military analyst Rick 
Atkinson, writing for the Washington Post. “How audacious do you want to be?”33 
Opening shots: the ‘decapitation strike’ 
 The world first learned of the US offensive late the evening of March 20th, 
when the American and British forces crossed the Iraqi border. But in fact, special 
forces had already been engaged for some days. It is not known exactly when they 
went in, but they were introduced into the western areas of Iraq, adjacent to Jordan. 
By the time the operations started in the south, the coalition forces – according to 
General Franks – already had between 15 and 20 teams operating there. To aid their 
operations, about 50 visual observation posts on the border with Jordan were taken 
out the first night and the other 50 the second night. Through this gap the special 
forces moved in and, in fact, controlled 25% of western Iraq even before the border 
in the south was crossed. And this with the regime in Baghdad having only the 
foggiest idea of what was going on.34 
 The shooting war started controversially. The date set for the beginning of 
the attack was originally March 21st, 2003, and the military planned accordingly. But 
more than a day before, their plans were severely disrupted. 
 On the morning of March 19th, President George Bush polled his war 
council in the White House Situation Room for any last-minute reservations about 
the campaign plan. There were none. He then issued the “execute” command to 
General Tommy Franks, who participated via a video link, saying: “I believe the 
military forces of the country are in position to do what must be done, so you have 
the execution order, H Hour will be this time.” Franks answered with a salute, an 
eyewitness told the New York Times, “You could have heard a pin drop in that room. 
It was silent for a couple of minutes.” Then the secretary of state, Colin Powell, 
reached out to touch the president’s hand in a gesture of support, of an 
understanding of the risks they are were taking.35 
 Less than six hours later, the plan had to be adjusted again. During the early 
afternoon, CIA director George Tenet learnt from a spy that Saddam would be in a 
certain bunker in Baghdad that night. Franks had already ordered two F-117 Stealth 
Fighters, loaded with heavy bunker buster bombs, into the air. Bush, Tenet, 
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Rumsfeld, General Richard B. Myers (chairman of the joint chiefs of staff), national 
security advisor Condoleezza Rice and White House Chief of Staff came together to 
discuss the matter. At 1912, three minutes before what Franks said was the latest a 
decision could be made, Bush made up his mind. “Let’s go,” he said.36 Because of 
the built-in flexibility, the disruption was minimal. 
 Within a few minutes, the bunker busters were dropped, and Baghdad was 
rocked by a loud explosion. According to reports at the time, Saddam apparently 
escaped. CIA sources reported that he was ostensibly carried off on a stretcher, blue 
in the face and taking oxygen. A dozen or so Tomahawk missiles were also launched 
on Iraqi government buildings in downtown Iraq. A few minutes later, in a four 
minute TV speech Bush announced that the nation was at war.37 
 This was the official version, widely reported in the media. However, what 
happened on this night is something of a mystery. Some weeks after the war, CBS 
Evening News astoundingly reported that the bunker, in fact, never existed. Based 
on the testimony of US Colonel Tim Madere, the officer in charge of inspecting key 
sites in Baghdad, the TV network stated that there never seems to have been a 
bunker on the site where the bombs exploded. “When we came out here, the primary 
thing they were looking for was an underground facility, or bodies, forensics, and 
basically, what they saw was giant holes. No underground facilities, no bodies,” 
Madere told the network. CBS, saying it was the first news organisation to visit the 
site, reported that the CIA had searched it once and Madere had searched it twice as 
part of the efforts to find traces of DNA that could indicate if Saddam or his sons 
had been killed or wounded. The network said the main palace in the compound 
remained standing despite the surrounding destruction. It quoted Madere as saying 
anyone who had been in the building could have survived the raid.38 
 Whether the Americans had been misinformed or whether it was a case of 
deliberate disinformation is not clear.  Whatever the case may be, it completely 
disorganised the campaign plan. The beginning of the air attacks was supposed to 
have started on the 21st, and the ground offensive a day later. Now everything had to 
be hurriedly moved up a day.39 And then, in the afternoon of the 20th, word came 
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that the Iraqis were torching some oil wells, and the attack was moved up several 
hours.40 
 As discussed, American troops – special forces – were already in Iraq. Two 
days beforehand, 12-member teams of the special forces were sent in by helicopter 
in southern and western Iraq to hunt for Scud missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. 
Navy Seals moved to oil terminals and pumping stations in preparation for the 
amphibious landing of the Marines.41 
The march to Baghdad, phase I 
 Thus, late in the evening of Thursday, March 20th, the first shots of the 
ground war fell. A huge artillery bombardment began on the Iraqi units immediately 
north of the border, and shortly afterwards, the lead elements of the 3rd Infantry and 
1st Marines crossed the sand berms, fences and electrified razor wire through a series 
of breaches on the border, almost without any resistance being encountered.42 High 
overhead, a strong bomber group, consisting of 3 bat-like stealthy B-2’s, 12 veteran 
B-52s and an assortment of tanker aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft and fighter 
escorts, flew towards Baghdad to hit airfields with aircraft capable of dropping 
chemical weapons.43 A few hours later, Royal Marines from the helicopter carrier 
HMS Ocean and the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal made an amphibious and 
helicopter landing on the Faw peninsula, the only small piece of Iraqi coastline. 
Almost immediately, Iraqi troops, especially from the 51st Mechanised Infantry 
Division, started surrendering. (Later, it transpired that a junior officer masqueraded 
as the divisional commander, causing the Americans to cheer prematurely.44) Many 
others simply ran away. Within a few hours, the Americans seized the town of 
Safwan and reached the harbour of Umm Qasr, while the Royal Marines secured 
Faw – with its oilfields – so rapidly that the torching of most of the oil wells was 
prevented.45 
 Right from the beginning, the Iraqi regular forces fought mostly very badly 
or not at all. This did not apply to the irregulars. 
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 The original idea was that 1 (UK) Armoured Division would wait for two 
days before following in the Marines’ footsteps, while the Marines would by-pass 
Basra, the second Iraqi city, and then press on northwards. However, the Iraqis 
started bombarding Kuwait and the Faw with missiles, creating the fear that Iraqi 
resistance might prove more serious than expected. The decision was then made, 
according to admiral sir Michael Boyce, chief of the UK defence staff, to throw in 
the British tanks and infantry immediately and have them advance directly on 
Basra.46 
 The British reached the city quickly, but rather than trying to storm into 
Basra and conquer the city by street-to-street-fighting, they invested it. While on the 
outskirts, rumours came of an uprising in the city, but nothing came of it. Divisional 
artillery did, however, take out enemy mortars and cannon seen in the city.47 A day 
or so later, some Challenger tanks of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards encountered 
an Iraqi convoy of T-55 tanks and armoured vehicles, apparently trying to break out. 
The Challengers took them on with gusto, and altogether 14 tanks and several other 
vehicles were destroyed without a single British casualty.48 
 While the British moved in the direction of Basra, the 3rd Infantry and some 
elements of the 1st Marines meanwhile advanced at a blistering pace north-
westwards, the former moving through the desert more or less parallel with the 
Euphrates in the west, and the latter more eastwards towards Nasiriyah on the 
Euphrates. In their wake a huge train of supply convoys followed. “On the Kuwaiti 
side,” a journalist who witnessed the scene from a helicopter reported, “the lines of 
tan U.S. military vehicles stretched as far back as the eye could see: massive five-ton 
trucks pulling trailers loaded with supplies; fuel trucks; ambulances; Humvees with 
trailers behind them.”49 In the wake of the 3rd Infantry came the lead elements of the 
101st Airborne with the idea of establishing refuelling bases before launching deep 
helicopter-borne troop attacks towards Baghdad.50 
 Before describing the Americans’ advance, one has to point out an 
interesting innovation. The spearpoints of their advance, in the form of 3rd Infantry 
and 1st Marines, did not move as they normally would, by brigade. On the contrary, 
the brigades were all mixed up into brigade combat units or Marine combat units, 
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either infantry- or armour-heavy. According to Williamson Murray and Major-
General Robert H. Scales, “[e]ach was essentially a self-contained close combat unit 
which, thanks to the speed and killing power of Bradleys and Abrams tanks, had the 
ability to command as much ground as an entire division during the Cold War.”51 
This was similar to the Kampfgruppen which the Germans employed often and with 
great success during the Second World War. 
 On the first day, other elements of the 1st Marines secured their first 
objective, the oil fields around Rumaila, about 30 km west of Basra. After a fast 
dash in their vehicles, they dismounted and advanced on foot, encouraging the Iraqis 
by loudspeaker to surrender. This was achieved within a few minutes.52 
 On day 2, the Marines reached the Euphrates at Nasiriyah with its 
strategically important bridges over the river, where they had to fight hard to take 
the crossings, losing 15 vehicles and 60 wounded in the process.53 The following 
day, the 3rd Infantry reached a position north of Najaf, also on the Euphrates and 
only about 90 km from Baghdad.54 This meant that the latter division had advanced 
about 500 km in less than 72 hours. This made it one of the fastest armoured 
advances in all of military history. In May, 1940, the advance of General Heinz 
Guderian’s panzer corps took six days from its breakthrough at Sedan on the Meuse 
on May 14th until reaching the sea near Abbéville on the 20th – a distance of about 
300 km.55 More than a year later, in Russia, the initial advance was even more rapid. 
The two panzer corps of Colonel Generals Hermann Hoth and Guderian, both 
belonging to Army Group Centre, separately marched more than 400 km in six days, 
before closing the trap east of Minsk to surround several hundred thousand Russians 
troops.56 And in June, 1967, the lead elements of Major-General Israel Tal’s 
armoured division reached the Suez Canal about 60 hours after starting the advance, 
a distance of just over 240 km.57 
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 The significance of this extremely rapid advance was, of course, lessened by 
the fact that it was made through open desert. The 3rd Infantry encountered very little 
resistance, having outflanked the Iraqi defensive lines in the extreme south and 
avoiding all defended centres during the march. Only one sizeable fight was reported 
– in “a town south of the Euphrates river”, where 45 Iraqi soldiers were killed by US 
artillery fire.58 Here at Najaf airport, the Iraqis for the first time resisted fiercely. A 
force of militiamen opened fire on the 2nd Brigade’s Abrams and Bradleys and kept 
the Americans busy for several hours. Pickup trucks with machine guns mounted on 
the back and with RPG-7 rocket launchers carried out several charges, amounting to 
suicide attacks, storming at the US armour. The Americans massacred them. As 
Major Kevin Dunlop told a reporter, “It’s not a fair fight. Trucks with machine guns 
against tanks and Bradleys can have only one outcome. We are slaughtering 
them.”59 Then some 30 Iraqi armoured vehicles attacked the Americans from the 
north. Before the Americans could counterattack, however, air strikes and artillery 
fire wiped out the Iraqi force.60 
 At Najaf, the division became stuck here for several days, having outrun its 
supply lines.61 Besides, after three days with only catnaps possible, the troops were 
dead tired. Some vehicles were damaged in accidents, the drivers falling asleep 
behind the controls.62 
 Further east, the 1st Marines drove northwards, after having crossed the 
Euphrates at Nasiriyah, fighting their way through repeated ambushes, towards Kut. 
Reinforcements came from the south-east, where other Marine units left Basra and 
its surroundings to the UK 1 Armoured Division.63 To facilitate the rapid march, the 
division at first left 75% of its vehicles behind. Colonel Mike Oehl, a Marine tank 
battalion CO, put fuel bladders on each side of the tanks to lessen their dependence 
on logistics.64 
 It is a very relevant question why the regular Iraqi forces fought so badly, or, 
in some cases, not at all. Why were the vital bridges over the Euphrates allowed to 
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fall undamaged into the hands of the Americans? One answer must be, undoubtedly, 
the Americans’ rapid deep penetration into the country, which stunned and paralysed 
the Iraqis. But there was also another important reason. After the war General 
Tommy Franks disclosed that US special operatives had bought off certain Iraqi 
senior officers not to fight. This happened well before hostilities started, and the 
payments were made to officers who were in key positions and whose support were 
considered necessary for a rapid and relatively bloodless victory. As an anonymous 
senior Pentagon official was quoted: “How mush does a cruise missile cost? Well, a 
bribe is a PGM [precision-guided missile]: it achieves the aim but it’s bloodless and 
there’s zero collateral damage.”65 
 Things were about to go wrong. The first sign of this was when the 7th 
Cavalry encountered a worrisome new phenomenon near Samawah – bands of 
irregular fedayeen – which attacked the Americans with death-defying courage, if 
not very intelligently.66 Furthermore, a unit of maintenance troops took a wrong turn 
in Nasariyah and were led into an ambush by a group of these fighters. Although 
they fought hard, several were killed and five – four men and a woman – taken 
prisoner. (The female prisoner, Jessica Lynch (19), was later freed by special 
forces.67 Later, General Franks conceded that this was for him the low point in the 
campaign.68) At the same time, Marines in the city were ambushed at least twice, 
and although they beat of the attackers, they apparently were shaken by the fact that 
Nasiriyah, contrary to what they had been led to believe, was not secured.69   
 Apparently, groups of fedayeen and other irregulars capitalised on the 
coalition approach to bypass potential points of resistance, so as to keep up the pace 
of the advance. For several days, every time an American supply convoy wanted to 
cross the bridges over the Euphrates, irregulars took them under fire, and they had to 
fight their way through time and again. Some Marines talked of “ambush alley”; 
others of a “turkey shoot” – themselves being the turkeys.70 
 The irregulars were helped by the fact that they were not under the 
operational command of the army – at least this is what one deduces from their 
independent attitude. Traditionally, the Iraqi army – like its mentor, the Soviet army 
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– operated under a rigid control from a headquarters, with very little leeway for 
independent thought and conduct allowed for local commanders. In this case, the 
irregulars used their own initiative. They also used every dirty trick in the book, and 
some not in it. Pretending to surrender or mixing with civilians, they would 
suddenly open fire.71 A suicide bomber killed four GIs at a checkpoint north of 
Najaf.72 Becoming extremely jittery, these type of events caused a Marine to open 
fire on a civilian vehicle, killing all inside. A search was made, but no weapons was 
found inside.73 If the guerrillas’ purpose was to drive a wedge between the 
Americans and the civilian population, it seemed to be succeeding. 
 More or less the same happened on the Marines’ march towards Kut. “In the 
south we fought their regular army,” Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Conlin, CO of 
the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, told a reporter. “Here we are fighting against 
a group that employs mostly guerrilla tactics. It has some of the feeling of the 
conflict in Afghanistan, because we have to fight both conventional and 
unconventional forces.”74 
 By March 28th, the exhausted 1st Marines could go no further. A journalist 
with the 11th Marine Regiment reported that the force “had all but exhausted its 
supplies of fuel, food rations, ammunition, and morale was at an all-time low. The 
officers said that it lacked everything: ‘beans, bullets and Band-Aids’.” As 
Lieutenant-Colonel Neil Gentry, in charge of logistics, said, first it was the sheer 
pace of the dash towards Baghdad. Then there were some awful mud storms. Now 
he had to cope with Iraqi “civilians” who wave and smile at his supply convoys, and 
then lob mortars and grenades as they drive past. “Everybody’s taken a few 
potshots,” he said.75 The tank crews were limited to a little water and two, 
sometimes one meal a day. At one stage, the Marines who were guarding command 
vehicles had only 30 rounds each.76 
 A counterattack by regular Iraqi forces with T-55 tanks in the dead of night 
was stopped in its tracks and obliterated by American F-16 fighter-bombers.77 
 At the same time, British and American Marines had to fight hard for control 
of Umm Qasr, which was secured only on March 27th.78 The Iraqis – and this 
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included a few units of the regular army – fought much better and harder than 
expected. The anticipated uprising of the oppressed Shiite Iraqis in the south did not 
take place. Wary of American promises of help, which did not materialise when they 
rebelled in 1991 against Saddam, they stayed neutral, watching how things went. As 
an American officer remarked at the time, “It’s always bad to build plans based on 
the co-operation of the enemy.”79 
 Another sign of trouble was the big helicopter gunship attack by the 11th 
Attack Helicopter Regiment, an independent unit attached directly to V Corps, on 
the evening of March 22nd, on the Republican Guard’s Medina mechanised infantry 
division near Karbala. According to Lieutenant-General William S. Wallace, 
commander of V Corps, the idea was to demonstrate that Army aviation could 
devastate a heavy division. But everything went wrong. Instead of attacking in co-
operation with the Air Force – at the very least to take out AA fire – the 34 AH-64D 
Apache Longbow gunships went in alone. A wall of fire greeted them. “It was as if 
we had stirred a hornet’s nest,” one of the pilots told CNN. Also, the Iraqis were 
warned by a network of observers with mobile phones. One Apache was shot down 
by small-arms fire and the two-man crew taken prisoner. The rest were peppered by 
23mm cannon, which chewed up their rotor blades and blew gaping holes in their 
hulls. When they limped back to base, having destroyed as little as five tanks and 
some vehicles, it was determined that at least 27 were not serviceable any more, 
having been damaged too severely.80 The regiment was unfit for further combat. 
Clearly, a rethink about helicopter gunship operations was needed, as the Army’s 
most important deep-attack weapon appeared to be neutered. 
 That evening, the military historian Rick Atkinson, embedded with the HQ 
of the 101st Airborne, was present during a teleconference discussion between pilots 
of the 11th Aviation Regiment and some of their counterparts with the 101st 
Airborne. According to his book about his experiences, the following points were 
made: 
• No precise intelligence about the location of the targets was available, only 
vague indications. “The attack therefore required what the Army called a 
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movement to contact – groping for the enemy – rather than the deliberate 
attack preferred by the marauding helicopter units”; 
• Due to the speed of the 3rd Infantry’s advance, the attack was advanced by 
24 hours, which allowed precious little time for proper planning; 
• Instead of the flanking attack from the west favoured by the regiment’s 
planners, V Corps allowed only a direct attack from the south because of 
fear that the flanking movement might encroach on 101st Airborne’s air 
space; 
• While in the air, US intelligence eavesdroppers identified at least 50 cell 
phone calls by Iraqi observers, being a very effective early warning system. 
(The direct route enabled the defenders to bring their defences up to speed in 
time); 
• The Americans preferred not to disable the area’s power grid. This left the 
defenders with a very useful command and control device – at a certain 
juncture, all the lights were centrally turned off and on again. The next 
moment, all hell broke loose as everybody with a gun started firing on the 
Apaches; 
• The unbelievably long time of 30 minutes was allowed between suppression 
of enemy air defences and the actual attack. Normally, the one should follow 
immediately after the other to prevent the enemy from regaining his breath.81 
 It would not be until April 3rd that the 11th, its choppers patched up, was able 
to return to the battle – and even then not in full strength.82 
 In general, it was apparent that the advance was in trouble. To make things 
worse, a blinding sandstorm broke out, making life for the troops exceedingly 
difficult and movement on the ground impossible. Eyewitnesses with the Marines 
reported: “Around midnight above the wind came a low, coughing growl that then 
grew into a roar, followed by lightning. The thunderstorm lasted an hour, the rain 
lashing them, hardening into sleet pellets and finally into hail. Then the wind shifted 
from the south to the west and blew in as icy as winter. Throughout that night of 
wind, dust, rain, and biting cold [sergeant] Johnson trooped the line, rotating his men 
to the cramped shelter of an Amtrac. Each took turns out of the wind for half an 
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hour, recovering body warmth and then following the communications wire back to 
their fighting holes.”83 
 Back home, some people started to doubt that the war was a good idea after 
all. 
The operational pause 
 The operational pause that followed was forced on the Americans for several 
reasons. They simply needed to sleep and rest – a body can, after all, only take so 
much punishment and not more. They had to replenish their food, fuel, ammunition, 
spare parts, medical supplies – there was a shortage of almost everything an army on 
the march needs. Perhaps more importantly, it was a chance to reflect on how to 
extricate themselves from what some observers feared was a morass in which they 
had become bogged down. 
 Especially since Gulf I, a new phenomenon popped up in warfare. This was 
the intense way the war was instantly being dissected in the media. The major TV 
news networks – the BBC, Sky News, CNN, Fox – as well as newspapers 
commissioned knowledgeable journalists or retired officers to comment on the 
operational and tactical approach. Invariably, without all the facts at their disposal, 
and (this especially applied to retired generals who had no reason to love Donald 
Rumsfeld and took the opportunity to snipe at him), they sometimes got it wrong. 
This was, after all, merely, the first draft of history, so to speak. But they also helped 
creating the agenda for public debate. And therefore, for a few days, the Pentagon 
had to divert considerable energy to defend itself against critics. 
 Halfway into the war, Time Magazine perhaps summed up the problem best: 
“If the Pentagon’s plan was to fight from the ‘inside out’ – a lightning drive on 
Baghdad to decapitate the regime and then liberate the rest of the country – Saddam 
has counterattacked from the outside in. He let allied forces plunge deep inside Iraq, 
leaving their rear and flanks ill protected so that his forces could harass and ambush 
them. His aim was shrewd and twofold: to pester and wear down allied forces and to 
lure the US into inflicting politically costly civilian casualties.”84 
 And the London Observer asked: “Should the US and British military 
planners have anticipated this combination of tactics? The answer, say some military 
sources, is yes. It has long been known that Saddam is an admirer of the tactics of 
Stalin, particularly his order of ‘Not One Step Back’, issued for the defence of 
Stalingrad, where the German 6th Army was sucked into a street-by-street and 
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building-by-building attack. Intelligence officers have known for some time that 
Iraqi officers have been making studies of US military failures, from Vietnam to 
Somalia, to assess weaknesses in US technology and military planning, and 
vulnerability to unconventional tactics …”85 
 With the offensive stalled and with the background of infighting between 
Rumsfeld and his Pentagon civilian advisors on the one hand, and a lot of generals 
on the other, the knives came out. Suddenly, a lot of leaks were made to the media. 
One such leak, particularly damaging to Rumsfeld, was of a wargame in 2002, 
called Millennium Challenge, in which a retired Marine General, Paul van Riper, 
acted the part of a rogue Middle Eastern military leader. By using more or less the 
tactics which now were practised by Saddam Hussein, he inflicted huge losses on a 
US force. A British newspaper reported: “He was so successful the wargame had to 
be stopped, and the old general was instructed to play ‘by the rules’. He pulled out 
of the exercise in protest.”86 
 Another leak was about a CIA assessment before the war, warning of “hit 
and run tactics” and using “RPG’s and small arms”.87 In addition, all the details of 
the whole infighting between Rumsfeld and the generals before the war was leaked 
to The New Yorker magazine.88 But perhaps the most damaging comment to 
Rumsfeld came, quite openly and on the record, from Lieutenant-General William S. 
Wallace, commander of V Corps. “The enemy we’re fighting is different from the 
one we’d war-gamed against,” he said during a visit to the 101st Airborne’s HQ. 
Referring to the suicide attacks, he said, “The attacks we’re seeing are bizarre – 
technical vehicles [bakkies] with .05 calibers and every kind of weapon charging 
tanks and Bradleys. It’s disturbing to think that someone can be that brutal.” Asked 
whether this meant that the war could last much longer than planners had made 
provision for, he answered, “It’s beginning to look that way.”89 
 And col. (ret.) Ralph Peters, a well-known military commentator and 
novelist, said pointedly, “No secretary of defence at least since Robert McNamara 
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has made himself so hated by the people in uniform, because he treats them 
absolutely arrogantly and General Franks begged for more troops.”90 
 The question was indeed: Were there enough troops to do the job? Were the 
three American divisions, of which only one was a really heavy formation, 
adequate? No, said General (ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey, who commanded the 24th 
Mechanised Infantry Division in the Gulf War. “In my judgement, there should have 
been a minimum of two heavy divisions and an armoured cavalry regiment on the 
ground – that’s how our doctrine reads.”91 (Of course, there were two heavy 
divisions in the initial invasion force, but one was prevented by Turkey’s refusal to 
let the 4th Infantry invade Iraq from the north.) 
 Some commentators did indeed leap to the troops’ defence. British Major-
General (ret.) Julian Thompson pointed out that wars “rarely go precisely to plan”. 
Despite “the worst sandstorm in years, and tougher than anticipated resistance … US 
troops have advanced impressive distances.” As wars go, he wrote, “this one has 
progressed quite well so far, but there is a long haul ahead”.92 Colonel Richard Hart 
Sinnreich, former director of the Army School of Advanced Military Studies and 
one of the most respected military observers in the US, cautioned that there was 
“still a lot of [US] combat power in the region that has not yet engaged with Iraqi 
forces”. The attacks by the Fedayeen and some Iraqi regular army forces on the 
American lines of communication were “pinpricks”, he added.93 And an irritated 
White House official snapped, “”Imagine if FDR had to put up with this between D-
Day and the fall of Berlin.”94 
 On March 25th, Lieutenant-General David D. McKiernan, commander of the 
coalition ground forces, officiated over a video teleconference with his top officers 
to decide what to do next. According to one eyewitness, some of the generals were 
“pessimistic about continuing to Baghdad without first securing overextended 
supply lines and cleaning out fierce pockets of resistance in the south”. On the other 
hand, Lieutenant-General James T. Conway, the senior Marine officer in the theatre, 
“argued that in just five days, the US ground force had seized Iraq’s southern oil 
fields, captured two critical bridges over the Euphrates River and raced up the road 
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toward the capital.” Conway conceded that there were casualties, but, he continued, 
“as a result of this action, we are now ready for the push to Baghdad”.95 It is not 
known what decisions, if any, were taken during this conference. Deducing from 
what happened afterwards, it may be assumed that it was planned to resume the 
advance as soon as possible. 
 A few days later, on March 29th, those who were in favour of pressing on as 
soon as possible, received powerful backing out of Washington. On that day, 
president Bush convened a teleconference from Camp David with his senior national 
security advisors and officers, and, according to one report, “decided to keep the 
military’s sights fixed on Baghdad, calculating that the Iraqi capital remained the 
primary objective in the war”. Again the word went out to the troops: “Speed, speed, 
speed!”96 
 Because of the pressing need to safeguard the long lines of supply, it was 
also decided not to use the airborne troops in the way planned. Instead, they were 
pressed into service in the rear areas. During the March 24th teleconference, it was 
decided to use 101st Airborne to subdue Najaf, while General Tommy Franks 
released the extra brigade from 82nd Airborne from the operational reserve to V 
Corps to mop up Nasiriyah.97 Some soldiers of the latter unit told a reporter that this 
represented a clear deviation of their original mission, which was to make an 
airborne attack on the Saddam Hussein International Airport just outside Baghdad. 
The threat to the American lines of communication meant that the brigade had to be 
diverted.98 Lieutenant-General William Wallace, CO of V Corps, himself conceded 
that the Iraqi irregulars, who “were more fanatical and aggressive then we expected 
them to be”, caused him headaches. It meant that places which the Americans 
planned to bypass now had to be fought for.99 He conceded that he could not 
“discount the fanaticism with which the paramilitaries fought”. He was “not willing 
to ignore the threat it posed”. Although he had “a very strong point of the spear with 
the 3rd Infantry Division”, he did not have “a heavily mobile secondary force”. At 
the time, the mobility of the 101st Airborne was restricted, as the division did not 
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have enough vehicles at the front, the bulk still being either in Kuwait or underway. 
This, General Wallace said, “was the low point of the entire campaign for me”.100 
ater, the 101st did bring its helicopters forward to landing strips in the western desert 
on March 26th, but these weapons were not able to take on the Republican Guard by 
itself.101 
 At the same time, according to another report, the original plan regarding the 
British had to be amended as well. The British 7 Armoured Brigade was originally 
intended to move northward after the fall of Basra (which was expected fairly 
quickly) and establish a rear base for the advancing US Marines. In the face of the 
continuing resistance in the city the Desert Rats could not be released.102 
 The continuing fight to safeguard the American lines of supply was at times 
hairy, but was helped by the fact that the Iraqis did not fight very intelligently. 
Rather than scatter their guerrilla forces, as guerrilla doctrine demands,103 the Iraqis 
concentrated their fighters in a few buildings, typically the local headquarters of the 
Baath Party. In an interview after the war Franks observed a pattern: Rather than 
defending the cities, the paramilitaries “simply collapsed back into the city and went 
to the intelligence HQ or SSO [Special Security Organisation] HQ or Baath Party 
HQ, drove their trucks up to the building and went inside to do whatever it is they 
do. Our troops identified this early.  Thus the solution to the Fedayeen challenge was 
to fight them on the lines of communication until they withdrew to Baath Party 
headquarters and then to destroy the headquarters.” Large numbers of fighters were 
killed in this way. The Americans also noticed that when they moved armour into 
the cities, “the Fedayeen would sacrifice themselves by climbing up on the tanks. 
They had no tactics to deal with armour. The Marines moved very successfully 
through and cleared a major headquarters in Nasiriyah … It was determined that this 
technique was very effective in dealing with the paramilitary: to move armour into 
urban areas. First the Brits moved into Basra. Then the Marines made a move into 
Nasiriyah with armour formations. Very effective. Same thing with 101st [Airborne] 
as it moved into Najaf. So what later turned out to be the thunder runs into Baghdad 
had been informed by fights in each one of these cities, and that was how 
[Lieutenant-General David] McKiernan [CO of all the coalition ground forces in the 
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theatre and Lieutenant-General] Scott Wallace [CO of V Corps] determined the 
tactic and technique to secure Baghdad.”104 
 The Americans also used to broadcast through loudspeakers that the Iraqi 
fighters were sexually impotent. For the Iraqi macho fedayeen, this insult frequently 
was too much to bear, with the result that they recklessly charged the Americans, 
only to be killed en masse.105  
 In a slap to Rumsfeld, the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Knox, Texas and the 
1st Armoured Division in Germany were alerted to deploy to Iraq. (This would, 
however, take some weeks, as the formations had to be moved by sea.) As an 
interim measure, it was decided to rush the independent 2nd Armoured Cavalry 
Regiment by air to the theatre of operations to augment the forces already there.106 
This unit, however, did not arrive in time to see action. 
 In the meantime, possibly as a result of the video conference, the air attacks 
by the Air Force, Navy and the Marines’ organic air support were redoubled. The 
Air Force commander, Lieutenant-General T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, ordered a 
dramatic escalation in the assault on the Republican Guard divisions which were 
positioned astride the southern approaches to the capital. “We’re killing the 
Republican Guard,” he reportedly told his staff officers at a daily briefing at the US 
operations centre in Saudi Arabia. “But I want you to kill them faster.” 
 As a result of this, the air battle was rearranged. Tanker aircraft were ordered 
into Iraqi air space to give American fighter-bombers more time over the target 
areas. JSTARS and AWACS planes were also sent into Iraq. Combined, these 
lumbering aircraft, based on the Boeing 707 airframe (and quite defenceless) were 
able to survey hundreds of square kilometres at once. The sandstorms whipping 
across central Iraq which made any ground movement almost impossible at that 
time, were no impediment to the big planes, whose sophisticated sensors could see 
right through the dense dust clouds. Every time the Iraqis moved in a coherent 
formation, the JSTARS detected them at once and fed the information in real time to 
the relevant ground HQ’s. This meant, said the air operations director, Brigadier-
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General Dan Darnell, that US commanders “knew the layout of the Republican 
Guard forces better than their own division commanders did”.107  
 The result was a heavy, sustained air assault on the Republican Guard, the 
results of which would prove to be dramatic. Carpet-bombing by heavy B-52 and B-
1 bombers destroyed dozens of tanks and other vehicles. Aircraft on a variety of 
missions over Iraq were ordered to unload whatever ordnance they still had on board 
on the Republican Guard before returning to base. Apparently, the Iraqis believed 
that the sandstorms would protect them. In one instance, a number of Republican 
Guard T-72’s stayed concentrated so tightly near Najaf that a US air strike destroyed 
30 of them with just four JDAMS or satellite-guided bombs. It was an example of 
the awesome power and precision that the new weapons conferred on aircraft. In 
addition, the airstrip at Najaf was turned into a refuelling point for A-10 attack 
planes, giving them extra time over the battlefield.108 
 The Army also joined in the fray. Some 40 Apache gunships of the 101st 
Airborne struck targets around Karbala on the evening of March 28th. This time, 
different tactics were used compared to the previous time, when the 11th Attack 
Helicopter Regiment was badly mauled by the Medina Division. Their attack was 
integrated with that of fixed-wing fighter-bombers of the Air Force and the Marines, 
and although they did not discover large concentrations of troops, they were able to 
pinpoint six heavily defended targets to the Air Force and Navy, which promptly 
took them out. Ground artillery also joined in, bombarding suspected air defence 
sites beforehand to lessen the defence’s ability to resist the Apaches.109  
 The Republican Guard was, indeed, the key to the expected coming Battle of 
Baghdad. Of the six divisions, three were stationed to the south and three to the 
north of Baghdad – a strange disposition, if one takes into account that the northern 
front never really materialised as was envisaged in both Washington and Baghdad 
before the war. However, Saddam now appeared to see his mistake, and started 
moving two of the northern divisions round to the south. At one stage, the Medina 
Division, considered to be the best-armed Iraqi formation, even threatened the 3rd 
Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. However, on the way, the Iraqis were badly 
mauled. First, in spite of the weather, hundreds of satellite-guided JDAMS were 
unloaded on them. Then came the B-1B and B-52 bombers, saturating the area with 
carpet-bombing, inflicting horrific destruction. On the southern approaches, the 
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Americans now faced five divisions – or the remnants thereof –  the Adnan, Medina, 
Baghdad, the Hammurabi and the Nebuchanezzar.110 
 The need was to destroy all six divisions, to neutralise them as coherent 
fighting formations capable of undertaking operations before Baghdad could be 
approached. In case Saddam transformed Baghdad into another Stalingrad, it was 
imperative that the Republican Guard be rendered ineffective before they could pull 
back into the capital, thereby adding to Saddam’s forces there, and making it much 
more difficult for the attackers. In this, the coalition succeeded devastatingly. By 
March 31st, intelligence officers estimated that the Medina Division’s combat 
readiness was cut in half, with one particularly hard hit brigade down to as little as 
20%.111 Four days later, the estimate was that the Medina had only 18% of its 
firepower left and the Hammurabi 44%.112 But first, the Americans had to break 
through the Iraqi defence lines at Karbala and Kut. And the general expectation was 
still that the Iraqis would fight determinedly.113 
The air war 
 In fact, there was no air war from the Iraqi side. Not a single sortie was 
flown by the Iraqi air force during the entire three weeks of hostilities. After the 
shooting stopped, Australian special forces discovered a cache of 50 Iraqi fighter 
aircraft and AA missiles – including three Russian-built MiG-25s – at a base in the 
west of the country. Most of the aeroplanes were in good condition. Most were 
hidden in buildings or under camouflage netting, while others were even buried.114 
 This meant that American and British air superiority fighters had very little 
to do, other than to escort bombers without seeing any action. The “mud-movers”, 
by contrast, had plenty to do, and this has been and will be discussed elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, statistics show that the airmen mostly had it relatively easy. By the 
beginning of April, only 17 aircraft had been lost, all in accidents or friendly fire.115 
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 Interestingly enough, when compared to the Gulf War of 1991, it looks at 
first glance as if the air forces did considerably less than then. In 1991 there were 
120 000 sorties of all kinds, including 40 000 strike stories, and 265 000 bombs 
were dropped. In 2003 there were only 41 404 sorties, of which 15 500 were strike 
sorties, dropping 27 000 bombs. But bear in mind that only 10% of the bombs 
dropped in 1991 were “smart”, whereas this percentage now was about 68. Also, in 
1991 the focus of the strategic bombing campaign was on destroying the Iraqi 
infrastructure. Now, roads, railways, bridges, etc., were not targeted, only “regime 
targets”, in order to spare as much of the country as possible. And even these targets 
did not bear the brunt of the air campaign. The tactical bombing was concentrated on 
the Iraqi troops in the field – 82% of all the targets attacked from the air, were troops 
and/or their vehicles.116 
 Technology made this possible. In the Second World War, it typically took 
about 3 000 air sorties to eliminate a single target like a tank or a building. In the 
Gulf War, it took only 10 sorties. Now, one plane could – and frequently did – take 
out 10 targets.117 
 The intimidatory effect of this on both the Iraqi military and civilians was 
considerable. Exactly how helpless the Iraqis were against the overwhelming, 
sustained coalition air attack is illustrated by the following account of a British 
Tornado bomber which bombed targets in Baghdad: “Baghdad was ablaze,” the pilot 
recounted. “There were explosions going off every few seconds. We had anti-
aircraft fire to one side and multiple rocket launches were used against us, putting up 
about eight to ten missiles. We could see them, but they were never a threat ... When 
we got up we had to fly through a wall of coalition aircraft waiting to go in behind 
us. We found our way through. It was in some ways the most dangerous part. There 
was so much up there. I have never seen anything like it ... When we approached 
Baghdad it was a red glow on the horizon. The missiles were already doing their 
work ... I would not have wanted to be on the receiving end.”118 
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The march to Baghdad, phase 2 
 On Sunday morning, March 31st, the Americans started moving again. It 
seems that the idea was, at first, somewhat more limited than a full-scale resumption 
of the march. The first attacks were most likely only probing in nature, to establish 
the state of the Iraqi defences. During his daily briefing to the media in Qatar, 
Brigadier-General Vincent Brooks two days later spoke of “simultaneous, limited 
objective attacks near Al Hilla, Karbala, and As Samawa”, with the intention of 
creating “vulnerabilities in the Republican Guard defenses, and also to isolate the 
remaining pockets of resistance for destruction at a time of our choosing”.119 
 The renewed offensive started with two classic feints. On the eastern front, 
Major-General James N. Mattis, CO of the 1st Marine Division, sent his 1st Marine 
Regiment along the highway to the southern edge of Kut, while the 5th and 7th 
Regiments took off directly in the direction of Baghdad. This was meant to make his 
direct opponents, the Baghdad Division of the Republican Guard, believe that the 
Marines were splitting up, and that the attack on Kut would not be pressed to full 
strength. However, the 5th and 7th then circled back and slammed into the Iraqi rear, 
cutting up what remained of them after several days of intense air strikes. 
(Everything did not quite go according to plan, inducing the very aggressive Mattis 
to fire the commander of the 1st Regiment, Colonel Joe W. Dowdy, for not 
pressuring the Iraqis hard enough.)120 As a result, the division was, in the clinical 
military parlance, made “irrelevant to the battle” of Baghdad.121 In other words, it 
was for all intents and purposes destroyed. 
 When the Marines swept further forward, the Iraqi soldiers simply melted 
away. As Lieutenant-Colonel Doug Fairfield of the 1st Marines described it, “By the 
time we got here [Kut] there was no one left. They just went home, I guess. Tanks 
are everywhere. They have just been abandoned with helmets, uniforms and piles 
and piles of ammunition lying around.” The lead elements reached Hilla, well on the 
way to Baghdad.122 
 Already by April 1st, it was clear that the Iraqi resistance was crumbling, and 
what started as probing attacks turned into a headlong offensive towards Baghdad as 
the Americans exploited the situation. 
                                                          
119 Briefing at www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Transcripts/20030401.htm.  
120 Rick Atkinson et al: “Confused start, decisive end” (Washington Post, 13.3.2003); Jim 
Landers: “Alone and unafraid” (Dallas Morning News, 18.5.2003). 
121 Tony Perry & Geoffrey Mohan: “US troops break through Iraqi lines” (Los Angeles 
Times, 2.1.2003). 
122 News report by Reuters, 21.4.2003, as sent out to the media. 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 32, Nr 1, 2004. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
 33
 Three days later, the Iraqis tried to mount a counterattack to stop the 
Marines. A large force of Iraqi artillery and armoured vehicles moved out of the 
capital under cover of darkness, but was picked up by a Hunter reconnaissance 
drone. A good example of how the new technology helped to overwhelm the enemy, 
Marine officers watched the Iraqi column live on a video screen, while they co-
ordinated a devastating air attack. Some officers called out grid co-ordinates, while 
other passed them on directly to the aircraft either by telephone or Internet chat 
rooms. Then the Marine F/A-18 Hornets and AV/8B Harriers struck. According to 
an eyewitness, on the video screen “tiny figures could be seen running from the 
vehicles. At times a giant flash of light would blind the Hunter camera, and all that 
would be left on the highway would be smoking wreckage. On a few occasions, the 
initial hit was followed by repeated secondary explosions and crackling fireworks, 
suggesting that an ammunition truck had been struck. A bomb-assessment report 
indicated that about 80 vehicles were destroyed in what amounted to a turkey 
shoot.”123 
 In the west, another feint of the 3rd Infantry apparently completely fooled the 
Iraqi defenders. Upon receiving intelligence that the air strikes of the previous days 
had badly mauled the Medina Division, the US divisional CO, Major-General 
Buford Blount III, decided to deviate from the agreed plan. This would have been an 
orthodox concentrated assault through the so-called Karbala Gap. But he then took a 
calculated risk, namely to spread out his division. He ordered his 3rd Brigade to veer 
eastwards to the south of Karbala to draw the Iraqis’ attention away from his major 
thrust by the 1st Brigade northwards to the Karbala Gap. What was left of the 
Republican Guard divisions positioned themselves to the north-east on the road 
between Karbala and Baghdad. The 1st Brigade encountered only isolated resistance 
and seized the bridge over the Euphrates by nightfall on April 1st. Two days later, 
while the 2nd Brigade engaged remnants of the Medina Division (which was already 
on the verge of disintegration because of the air attacks124) from the front, the 1st 
Brigade advanced around their back and hit them suddenly with a hammer-blow. At 
the same time, the Air Force bombed them relentlessly from the air. This was the 
only orthodox tank battle of the war, and according to Brigadier-General Lloyd B. 
Austen, “the decisive battle of the war”. “We absolutely decimated what was left of 
Medina,” he told a reporter. According to other reports, about 800 soldiers of the 
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Medina were killed, without a single American casualty. And furthermore, the 
division advanced almost 70 km in a single day.125 
 Another source describes something which may have been the same fight. 
After what seemed like a fierce battle, all the Iraqi tanks were destroyed of disabled, 
and the surviving crews fled. The Americans suffered no losses. Upon examination 
of the ambush, it became clear that the enemy tanks were very well and 
professionally placed, but their salvos failed to hit a single US vehicle. The cause of 
this, an observer surmised, was that the Iraqis never got the chance to exercise with 
their guns and that the cannon themselves grew inaccurate with age.126 This must 
have been a great relief to the attackers. 
 Another eyewitness, who apparently saw only the air strikes, reported that 
by the time the Air Force was finished with the Medina, “there was practically 
nothing for the 2nd Brigade to fight, only burned-out hulks of vehicles with no Iraqi 
soldiers in sight.” As the army vehicles moved further, a growing number of white 
flags fluttered from civilian houses and buildings along the way. Only 24 hours later, 
on the evening of April 3rd, the 1st Brigade occupied the Saddam Hussein 
International Airport on the outskirts of the capital. A counterattack by irregulars 
and Republican Guards were beaten back with heavy losses.127  
 The division was now fighting through terrain entirely different from the 
desert they had moved through earlier. Now they were “in lush farmland, criss-
crossed with canals”. Everywhere they looked, the soldiers saw “the smoking 
carcasses of cars and trucks hit by American air power and artillery. Occasionally 
they see the burnt-out hulk of a Russian-made Iraqi tank.”128 
 In Baghdad itself, not far away, the rumbling of a new sound to the south 
startled the inhabitants. They had grown used to the loud explosions of bombs 
dropped on their city, but this was different. This was the sound of artillery, proof 
that the American steamroller was inexorably on the march. As an American 
reporter in Baghdad wrote: “They have come, just over the southern horizon. No one 
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in the city has seen them yet, but the steady drumroll of bombs, the steady thunder 
of artillery and the impunity with which allied airplanes roamed the sky all day left 
no doubt that the long-expected US forces had reached almost to the city’s edge.”129 
 For the time being, things inside the city went on relatively normal. People 
turned up for work, the telephones, water and electricity and public transport still 
worked. And Mohammed Saeed al-Sahad, the Iraqi minister of information, dubbed 
“Comical Ali” by some, still churned out his propaganda barrage to the effect that 
the attackers were being badly beaten. The journalists to whom he spoke had 
stopped believing him a long time ago. Now even the Baghdadi’s started doubting 
him.130 
 In the meantime, the Marines were closing in from the south-east as well. 
After having routed the Iraqis at Kut, they crossed the Tigris on April 2nd on a 
pontoon bridge and other bridges which had been taken intact. Company-sized units 
only of the enemy were encountered, and these did not stay around to fight for very 
long.131 Moving forwards, the Marines hit remnants of the Medina Division and 
scattered them. An Iraqi lieutenant taken prisoner, told them that they had been 
completely surprised by this rapid advance.132 
The northern front 
 Obviously, the refusal of the Turkish parliament to grant the American 4th 
mechanised Infantry Division permission to invade Iraq from the north, turned the 
northern front more or less into a backwater. Most of the action took place in the 
southern and central parts of the country. 
 Nevertheless, US special forces, together with Kurd rebels, created as much 
activity as they could to prevent the Iraqis from pulling back their troops in the north 
and moving them to the south, thereby making it more difficult for the southern 
attackers. On March 29th, these forces were strengthened by a force of 1 000 
paratroopers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, stationed in Italy, dropped on an airstrip 
in northern Iraq. These, later reinforced with more paratroopers, linked up with the 
special forces and the Kurds. Still later, a few tanks and armoured vehicles were 
flown in by huge C-17 transport aircraft. Also, the overwhelming US air power in 
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the form of huge AC-130 gunships and Navy bombers, proved decisive. With these 
forces, the Iraqi defence lines were harassed continually, and by March 28th, the 
Iraqis staged a tactical retreat of about 16 km southward towards Kirkuk.133 
 As the Iraqi defences around Baghdad collapsed, so did those in the north. 
By April 10th, the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk had fallen and occupied by the Kurds. 
These withdrew as soon as the Americans got there to prevent Turkish military 
intervention.134 With this, the war in the north was over. 
The occupation of Baghdad 
 The Battle of Baghdad, such as it was, was – just like the war itself – 
introduced with a thunderclap, an attempt to kill Saddam Hussein and to decapitate 
the regime. Somehow American intelligence learnt that Saddam would be in a 
certain underground bunker underneath a restaurant. After the decision was taken to 
kill him, the coordinates were transmitted rapidly to the air controllers in Saudi 
Arabia and from there to a B-1B bomber which happened to be in the air near 
Baghdad. Within 12 minutes of the information reaching US intelligence, the 
bomber dropped four JDAM bunker busters, which transformed the restaurant and 
bunker into a gaping hole in the ground.135 However, Saddam apparently narrowly 
escaped again – although whereto, remained a mystery. 
 Obviously, the Americans were in somewhat of a quandary how to occupy 
Baghdad. After all, hundreds of commentators were whipping up a frenzy of fear 
about Baghdad becoming a second Stalingrad, with hundreds, even thousands of 
dead American soldiers being shipped home in body bags. However, the example 
was provided by the British who, in Basra, were refusing to play the Iraqis’ game by 
trying to conquer the city forcibly. One should remember that the British came 
before the dilemma much earlier than the Americans, when the Iraqis were still 
relatively full of fight. By the time the US forces reached Baghdad, the enemy had 
been much more hammered and their morale much lower. 
 The British approach was to invest Basra and to regulate the civilian traffic 
in and out of the city as much as possible. Then they sent in units of Challenger 2 
tanks, Scimitar armoured reconnaissance vehicles and/or Warrior infantry fighting 
vehicles to conduct raids into the city, at first only into the outskirts, but later ever 
deeper. The purpose was obviously to kill some enemy fighters, but, more 
importantly, for the psychological effect, to intimidate the Iraqis and show them that 
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resistance was futile, that the Brits could move about almost at will. Attempts by 
some Iraqi army units to break out were repulsed. On March 30th, the suburb of  Abu 
al-Kacib to the south-east of the city, was attacked and occupied by 40 Commando, 
Royal Marines. The result was that the defences in the end simply imploded. By 
April 7th, Basra was all but completely in British hands.136 Donald Rumsfeld himself 
recognised these tactics as being “the pilot project of the US assault on Baghdad”.137 
 Therefore, the Americans at first, therefore, decided to emulate the British 
way and not storm the capital all at once. They started by launching an armoured 
raid, just as the British did in Basra, on Saturday, April 5th, deep into Baghdad, 
which became known as the “Thunder Run”. During the event, the 25 Abrams and 
12 Bradleys of the 4th Battalion, 64th Regiment were repeatedly confronted by men 
on foot, armed with machine guns or rocket launchers, firing from rooftops, 
windows or building corners, even by tanks, but the Americans let fly with 
everything they had and massacred whoever came in their way. According to an 
eyewitness, they destroyed “dozens of tanks, armoured vehicles, towed artillery 
pieces, fuel tankers and ammunition trucks. They left a long trail of smoking 
wreckage, some of it exploding long after their tanks had left the roadways about 10 
miles south of Baghdad.”138 Other reports stated that the Americans killed about 1 
000 Iraqis and destroyed some 100 vehicles.139 
 They made a powerful point, as Time put it: “Our tanks can penetrate your 
defenses at will, in broad daylight.” This, like nothing else, brought home to the 
Iraqis that they had lost the war.140 At the same time, the relentless air attacks had 
decimated the Iraqi forces to a very great extent. On the same day, Lieutenant-
General Michael Moseley, commander of the air forces in the theatre, called the 
Republican Guard units outside Baghdad “dead”. “We’re not softening them up, 
we’re killing them,” he said, and added that the Iraqi defence in terms of formations 
“doesn’t exist any more”. On April 7th, CENTCOM intelligence estimated that the 
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Republican Guard divisions in the vicinity of the capital had lost been reduced to 
some 30% of their original strength. On the next day, it was estimated that the 
Republican Guard had only 19 tanks left of their original 850 and 40 artillery pieces 
of their original 550.141 
 It is clear that these operational decisions worked like a charm. Indicative of 
this is an interview an American reporter had with a junior officer of the Republican 
Guard – one of the few of its kind, which makes very interesting reading indeed.142 
Captain Omar Khalidi served with a surface-to-air missile unit, which hid 
underneath some trees on agricultural land north of Baghdad. They were attacked 
from the air in the dead of night and while a fierce sandstorm was blowing. Six 
members of his unit were killed and much of their equipment destroyed. 
 “This affected the morale of the soldiers, because they were hiding and 
thought nobody would find them,” he said. “Some soldiers left their positions and 
ran away. When the big bombs hit their target, some of the vehicles just melted and 
the effect of the cluster bombs was even greater, because they covered a larger 
area.” 
 Khalidi told the reporter that most officers thought spies disclosed their 
location to the Americans, “because it was impossible to find us through satellite or 
aircraft. Even if you drove by, you couldn’t find it.” (Obviously, he had never heard 
of infrared detection equipment.) 
 Khalidi and his fellow officers also suspected that something untoward was 
going on between their generals and the Americans when the Republican Guard 
refused to defend Baghdad. “I think there was something fishy going on, some kind 
of contact between the Americans and the Iraqi commanders.” 
 They watched anxiously as the militia in the south resisted bravely, and their 
spirits were raised when the news came (untrue, as it turned out) that the Iraqis had 
won a glorious victory in a counterattack on the American force at Saddam Hussein 
International Airport outside Baghdad, destroying 80 tanks, killing 400 Americans 
and taking 200 prisoner. But the very next day the 3rd Infantry staged their “Thunder 
Run” through Baghdad. 
 Khalidi recounted: “It was just as if that last battle had no effect. It was a 
very big shock. Everyone was surprised that a military force could pass through all 
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the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard forces surrounding the 
presidential palaces, and everyone became afraid.” Besides, this was accompanied 
by “unimaginably heavy bombing”, including by low-flying A-10 Thunderbolt II 
tank-killer aircraft. “In the end, when US troops entered Baghdad, everything was 
messed up. There were no orders. We didn’t know where the commanders went. So 
everyone just went home.” 
 In the same news report, General Ghanem Abdullah Azawi, an engineer in 
the Iraqi army’s air defence command, made it clear that the army and Republican 
Guard suffered from a massive loss of morale and confidence even before Baghdad 
was invaded. “The army didn’t believe in it because it wasn’t a war, it was suicide.” 
He and his colleagues saw that “this war has no result, only death. Why should we 
fight to save Saddam? That’s why most of the commanders told their soldiers not to 
fight, just withdraw.” 
 No doubt, in later descriptions of the war more eyewitness accounts from the 
Iraqi side will be quoted. But it is unlikely that they will differ materially from these. 
And these ones make it clear that the ineptness of the Iraqi high command, possibly 
partly induced by American bribery, together with the relentless US air campaign 
and the audacity of the “Thunder Run”, broke the back of the Iraqi resistance. 
 The original idea, as Major-General Stanley McChrystal, a Pentagon staff 
officer, said some days before, was not “to drive into Baghdad suddenly and seize it 
in a coup de main”.143 Nevertheless, this is exactly what happened. The raid of April 
5th went extremely well from an American point of view, with the result that 
Generals McKiernan, Wallace and Conway conferred by televideo and decided that 
the 3rd Infantry would enter Baghdad from the West and the 1st Marines from the 
East. They would meet in the middle. The crumbling of the Iraqi defences would be 
exploited ruthlessly.144 
 On April 7th, the final attack for the possession of Baghdad was launched. 
Essentially, it was a repeat of the general campaign plan – a lightning drive deep 
into the city centre. General Blount started off by having his 2nd Brigade ram its way 
to the centre. The two tank battalions raced into the heart of the city to seize key 
installations, while the mechanised infantry battalion followed up to occupy the 
intersections and secure the supply route. On the way, heavy fighting took place, 
threatening to cut the whole force off. Fighters loyal to Saddam – a mixture of 
fedayeen, Special Republican Guards and Syrian volunteers swarmed around the 
American vehicles and almost overran a US infantry company, whose soldiers kept 
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their positions only by the skin of their teeth. In the end, however, dozens of the 
Iraqis’ vehicles were destroyed, and an estimated 350-500 killed.145 
 One of the journalists “embedded” with the infantry later wrote: “The 
Bradley fought its way to a traffic circle near a presidential palace that morning. We 
watched through the vision blocks as the big guns on the tanks and Bradleys of 
Cyclone company ripped into half a dozen suicide drivers speeding across the 14th of 
July bridge. They kept coming – wild-eyed men, some in uniform, some in civilian 
clothes, some firing AK-47s from passenger windows. 
 “The gunners inside the tanks and Bradleys kept up a wall of fire, ripping 
open chunks of roadway with warning shots before pulverising pickup trucks and 
sedans and human beings in flaming red explosions. Some vehicles exploded more 
than once as incendiary rounds set off ammunition or explosives stored inside. 
 “‘There’s brains and guts all over that bridge,’ Staff Sgt. Anthony J. Smith 
said with the spare and brutal commentary typical of so many soldiers I 
encountered.”146 This day’s fighting made one thing clear: All command and control 
among the Iraqis had collapsed. One tank officer, captain Dan Hubbard, told a 
reporter, “As the fighting went on, I realized they had no organization. It was like 
fighting a bunch of different groups that didn’t know what each other were doing.” It 
was the turning point. As Major Roger Shuck of the 2nd Brigade put it, “This 
mission is the one that cut the snake in half. Once this happened, everything just 
started crumbling and falling.”147 
 The next day, the 3rd Brigade moved in from the north and the 1st from the 
west, while the Marines attacked from the east. Some fierce fighting still followed, 
the Iraqis appearing in small, scattered groups, without any cohesion. But that day, 
everything more or less collapsed. Especially in Saddam City, the slum area in the 
eastern part, mainly populated by Shiite Muslims, the Americans were greeted with 
glee and applause. “Good, good Bush!” the crowds chanted. “Down, down 
Saddam!” Baghdad was free from Saddam’s dictatorship.148 
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 Specialist observers were ecstatic about the American tactics. John Pike, 
from GlobalSecurity.com, a Virginian think-tank, said: “I think that with the 
‘thunder-run tactic’ – basically taking the city all at once rather than trying to take it 
one room at a time – they appear to have correctly conceptualised that the assault on 
Baghdad was essentially a coup d’etat. When you have a coup, you basically grab 
the airport, grab the main government buildings downtown, grab the TV station, 
claim that you’re in charge, and dare anyone to dispute you.” The decapitation 
strategy “of taking our leadership objects as well as command and control and 
communications was critical to the disorganized defense of not only Baghdad but all 
of Iraq,” he said.149 
 Strange was the way in which the Iraqi government suddenly vanished off 
the face of the earth. On the final day, they simply didn’t turn up for work. Only 
later some of them either gave themselves up or were captured. Saddam Hussein 
was captured in a hole min the ground some months after the war, while his two 
sons, Uday and Qusay, were killed in a fierce firefight. Saddam’s faithful minister of 
information, Mohammad Said Sahhaf – the man who amused half the world by his 
fervent assurances that the Americans were nowhere near Baghdad; that they were 
there, but being overrun; that they were inside Baghdad, but committing suicide in 
their tanks – tried to give himself up, but the Americans regarded him as small fry 
and refused to take him in. This was perhaps the ultimate insult! According to one 
report, he quit his post only in the early morning hours of April 10th, apparently 
having believed to the last (just like his Nazi counterpart, Josef Goebbels) that a 
miracle would save the regime. When, in the evening of April 9th, a courier came to 
the Iraqi broadcasting house with a tape of Saddam exhorting the Iraqis to keep on 
fighting, his spirits lift a last time. “As I told you,” he said to an aide, “this is 
Saddam, this is the government, everything is normal.” But a few hours later, the 
aide told a British newspaper, he “slowly removed his black beret. He folded the 
epaulettes on his military jacket to hide his rank and then he reached for a red and 
white kaffiyeh scarf. He wrapped it around his head as he told us to keep on re-
broadcasting [the Saddam speech] until 3 am. He said goodbye, and then 
disappeared out of the back door.” “Comical Ali”, was he was dubbed, finally saw 
the light.150 
 A few days later, the US Marines resumed their advance northwards, while 
the 3rd Infantry and other Marines went on with the task of bringing order to 
Baghdad, which was fast degenerating into an orgy of looting and lawlessness. On 
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April 14th, the 3rd entered Tikrit, mindful of warnings of a “last stand” of Saddam 
loyalists. None was encountered. Tikrit fell without a fight. The same day, the main 
coalition military spokesman, Brigadier-General Vincent Brooks, pronounced 
“decisive military operations” at an end. At the same time, the Pentagon announced 
the recall of three aircraft carriers and the cancellation of the orders to the 1st 
Armoured Division and the 1st Cavalry Division to ship to Iraq.151  
 The conventional phase of the war was over. The guerrilla phase, with 
mounting attacks against American troops, especially in the so-called Sunni Triangle 
between Baghdad, Tikrit and Falluja, was about to begin, with uncertain prospects 
for the future. 
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